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THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ABROAD:
PUTTING JUSTICE INTO LEGAL REASONING
JAMES R. MAXEINER*

ABSTRACT

Americans are taking new interest in legal reasoning. Thinking Like a
Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning by Professor Frederick
Schauer suggests why. According to Schauer, American legal methods
often require decision-makers "to do something other than the right
thing. ,,) There has got to be a better way.
Now comes a book that offers Americans opportunities to look into a
world where legal methods help decision-makers do the right thing.
According to Reinhard Zippelius in his newly translated Introduction to
German Legal Methods, German legal methods help decision makers
resolve legal problems "in a just and equitable manner. ,,2
This Article sets out what good legal methods do: help decide legal
problems justly. It poses the puzzle: why does Schauer say legal methods
challenge rather than support doing the right thing, when Zippelius does
not? Relying on Schauer himself, the Article suggests an answer: neglect
of legislation and law application and fixation on appellate law-making. It
shows how German legal methods as described by Zippelius help decision
makers to do the right thing.

* James R. Maxeiner, J.D., LL.M., Ph.D. in Law (under Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Fikentscher,
Munich), Associate Professor of Law, Associate Director, Center for International and Comparative
Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank Kirk W. Junker, Mathias Reimann
and P. Matthew Roy for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Mistakes are my
own. I would also like to thank the University of Baltimore for providing a summer research stipend
that supported it. I dedicate it to the memory of Philip A. Maxeiner, Washington University, B.S.B.A.,
1934; University Student President, 1935; Juris Doctor, 1936; member of the St. Louis Law Review,
1935-1936 (predecessor of the Washington University Law Quarterly; and active supporter and
benefactor of the Washington University School of Law until his death in 1996. The author is
consultant to Common Good, and in particular, to their Start Over initiative. This Article predates that
relationship and gives only the views of the author.
1. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LiKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 212 (2009)
2. REINHOLD ZIPPELlUS, INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS 13 (Kirk W. Junker &
P. Matthew Roy, 2008).
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INTRODUCTION

"[R]ule-based and precedent based decision making often require
legal decision-makers to do something other than the right thing
"
-Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer:
A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning3
"The law must regulate human behavior in such a way that ... the
legal problems that arise in a society are resolved in a just and
equitable manner."
-Reinhold Zippelius,
Introduction to German Legal Methods 4
The American public should be distressed that in his new book,
Thinking Like a Lawyer: A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Professor
Frederick Schauer teaches law students that American legal methods often
require decision-makers "to do something other than the right thing."s It
should find disturbing that Schauer writes about legal reasoning without
using the word justice. Should not thinking like a lawyer have something
to do with realizing justice?
Elsewhere it does.
In Europe, Professor Reinhard Zippelius in his Introduction to German
Legal Methods, first published in German in 1971 and now translated into
English for the first time, teaches law students that legal reasoning helps
decision-makers resolve legal problems "in a just and equitable manner.,,6

3. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 212.
4. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 13.
S. SCHAUER, supra note I, at 212. No other scholar in the United States today is more identified
with rules and legal reasoning than is Schauer. See. e.g., Frederick Schauer, Introduction to KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011); FREDERICK F. SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN
LAW AND IN LiFE (1991). See generally Linda Meyer, Editor's Introduction to RULES AND
REASONING: ARTICLES IN HONOUR OF FRED SCHAUER (Linda Meyer ed., 1999) (introducing various
essays analyzing and even critiquing Schauer's legal reasoning methods). If the comments with which
Harvard University Press introduced Schauer's book are any indication, Schauer's book may become
an American standard. Professor Sanford F. Levinson describes it as "the best available introduction to
legal reasoning." Judge Richard A. Posner counts the book "as comprehensive, thorough, and
sophisticated an introduction to legal reasoning as it is a lucid one. All the bases are covered ... ." It
lays out "the entire range oflegal reasoning techniques."
6. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 13.
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The book's German original has been a standard student text for more than
forty years?
Although legal reasoning is not a topic of public debate in the United
States, its failures are. American dissatisfaction with civil justice has been
a recurrent theme in American history since the earliest days of the
republic. 8 As the country developed a modern commercial system it tried
and failed to develop a modern system of legal methods. 9 Today it limps
along with third rate methods rooted in a pre-industrial past.lO
There are many law reform organizations and many proposals for
reform. Commonly they focus on specific niches of the American legal
system, such as tort reform, representation for the poor, consumer
protection, caps on malpractice recoveries, loser-pays, and limitations on
punitive damages.
Law reform is a never-ending story because Americans implement
substantive law reforms with dysfunctional methods. America has interest
in reform and has ideas for reform, but does not have legal methods that
could make those reforms work well.
Recently the law reform organization, The Common Good, announced
a new initiative, "Start Over," that is directed to the legal system as a
whole. ll It deplores how Americans are "drowning in law.,,12 They live in
"fear of possible lawsuits."l3 Their hands are tied "by laws made by
political leaders who are long dead."l4 Government is paralyzed because
legislation tries to "calibrate correct choices in advance ... [when] it is

7. The first edition appeared under the title EINFOHRUNG IN DIE JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE
(1 st ed. 1971); the most recent is under the title JURISTlSTISCHE METHODENLEHRE: EINE EINFDHRUNG
(10th ed. 2006). The other classic students' text is KARL ENGISCH, EINFDHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE
DENKEN (lst ed. 1956; 10th ed. by Thomas Wiirtenberger & Dirk Otto, 2005). The classic academic
text is KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1st ed. 1960; 6th ed. 1991; 4th
condensed study ed. with Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, 2009). The global comparative work is WOLFGANG
FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDERDARSTELLUNG (5 vols. 1975-1977).
8. See JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYOOHO LEE & ARMIN WEBER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL
JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 260-65 (2011) [hereinafter MAXEINER, FAILURES]'
9. Id. at 263-65.
1O. See id. at 260-65.
11. About Common Good, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.orglpages/about-us (last
visited May 2, 2012) ("Our Start Over campaign, launched in May 2011, aims to influence the 2012
election by organizing public support for structural overhaul of government and law. Only people, not
rules, make things happen.").
12. The Problem: Drowning in Law, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.orglpages/theproblem (last visited May 2, 2012).
13. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Legal Fear, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.orgl
pages/legal-fear (last visited May 2, 2012).
14. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Democracy by Dead People, COMMON GOOD, http://www.
commongood.org/pages/democracy-by-dead-people (last visited May 2,2012).
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,,15
beyond human capacity to foresee every possible circumstance
Laws leave "no room for humans in charge to make essential choices;,,16
laws "have taken away people's authority to assert good values.,,'7 Start
Over sees the failings in the system itself and not in any single substantive
manifestation.
Start Over recognizes that incremental change is not enough. Where
nineteenth century reformers chose to work "with old materials and after
the old fashions,,,18 Start Over promotes real change. Starting over with
something new is daring. America has over one million lawyers. They are
invested in old ways of doing things. Yet few of them would deny that
those old ways do not work well for most people. It is time that they do
their part to fulfill the national pledge of "liberty and justice for a11.,,19
Elsewhere in the world, there are legal systems that work better. American
reformers need not imagine unproven methods; they can study methods
proven to work.
This translation of Zippelius' Introduction to German Legal Methods
begins to make it possible for monolingual Americans to look at how one
such system actually works. 20 The German system works well; it has long
been admired around the world?'

15. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Government Paralysis, COMMON GOOD, http://www.
commongood.org/pages/government-paralysis (last visited May 2,2012).
16. Id.
17. The Problem: Drowning in Law, Loss of Personal Responsibility, COMMON GOOD, http://

www.commongood.org/pages/loss-of-personal-responsibility (last visited May 2, 2012).
18. B.R. Curtis, N.J. Lord & R.A. Chapman, REpORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED To
REVISE AND REFORM THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851),
reprinted in 2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 149, 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879); see also James R. Maxeiner,
Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: Us. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VAL. U L. REV.
517,541,559-66 (2006) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy].
19. See The Pledge of Allegiance. 4 US.c. § 4. The Pledge of Allegiance was first published in
National School Celebration of Columbus Day: The Official Programme, THE YOUTH'S COMPANION,
Sept. 8, 1892, at 446.
20. In the past Americans interested in legal methods outside the common law had few learning
opportunities in English. Professor Kirk Junker is changing that in Carolina Academic Press' new
series Comparative Legal Thinking Series. Professor Junker's goal is to enable English-speaking
readers to "attain the unique inside view of the civil law student.'· Another title already available in the
series is ANTONIO LORDI & GUIDO ALPA, WHAT IS PRIVATE LAW? (2010). See also EVA STEINER,
FRENCH LEGAL METHODS (2002) (description of French legal methods from English perspective).
21. See. e.g., MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 8-9; LAW-MADE IN GERMANY (2nd ed.
2012), available at http://www.1awmadeingermany.de; DAS DEUTSCHE ZIVILPROZEJlRECHT UND SEINE
AUSSTRAHLUNG AUF ANDERE RECHTSORDNUNGEN (Walther J. Habscheid ed., 1991); John H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U CHI. L. REV 823 (1985); FREDERICK
FRANK BLACHLY & MIRIAM EULALIE OATMAN, THE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
GERMANY (Brookings Inst. 1928); Frederick William Maitland, The Making of the German Civil Code
in 3 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 484 (Fisher ed., 1911); Roscoe

2012]

THINKING LIKE A LAWYER ABROAD

59

In Part I, I set out what good legal methods do: help decide legal
problems justly. In Part II I pose the puzzle: why does Schauer say legal
methods challenge rather than support doing the right thing, when
Zippelius does not? Relying on Schauer himself, I suggest an answer:
neglect of legislation and law application and fixation on appellate lawmaking. In Part III I show how German legal methods as described by
Zippelius help decision makers to do the right thing.
In this Article, my goal is to raise Americans' awareness of foreign
legal methods using the book by Zippelius. I encourage Americans to not
dismiss civil law methods, but to find in them ideas proven to work. 22 I am
not, however, attempting a comparative study of legal methods.

Pound, The Causes of the Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep.
395, 397 (1906) (describing "the wonderful mechanism of modem German judicial administration").
For an exhaustive listing of contemporary Anglo-American reactions to the foundational German laws
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, see MARCIS DITTMANN. DAS BORGERLICHE
GESETZBUCH AUS STCHT DES COMMON LAW: DAS BGB UND ANDERE KODTFTKATTONEN DER
KAISERZEIT 1M URTEIL ZEITGENOSSISCHER ENGLISCHER UND ANGLO-AMERIKANISCHER JURISTEN
(2001 ).
22. Justice Scalia, are you listening? See Ethics in America: 8. Truth on Trial. recorded February
13, 1988 (PBS television broadcast Feb. 13, 1988) (hosting Justice Antonin Scalia as a panelist).
available at http://www.learner.org/resources/series81.html?pop=yes&pid=198. On the panel, Justice
Scalia argued:
The only alternative [to the adversary system] is to go to the inquisitorial system and have an
investigating judge. And then you are going to win or lose depending on how good a judge
you happen to have gotten. At least when you pick your lawyer. you know that if he's bad,
it's your fau It.
Id. at 53:30.
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1.

Justice-Cidl Justice.

JrSTICJ.: is the measuring om to each individual
what is his due, accordillg to the inllcxible rule of
right. Juslic(' j'8 frequently personified, and represEllted as holding it pair of balanced seales, thus
indicating its disposition 10 estimate things by the
trne and even &talldard of risz:ht,
Political or cit'it Justice,
the measuring out
""hat a man may claim according' to the l;:rws of
the land. If tl;e laws are founded ill absolute
justice, then liolitkal or legal justkc coincides
with absolute justice.

is

The Young American (popular schoolbook 1843i 3
It is elementary learning that law seeks justice. In the middle of the
nineteenth century Americans learned this from civics textbooks such as
the one illustrated here?4 "To establish justice," it taught, "is indeed the
great object of all good government.,,25 It cited the preamble of our
Constitution, to "establish justice," as the object of the nation, second only
to creating a more perfect union itself.26 It instructed students that civil

23. S.G. GOODRICH, THE YOUNG AMERICAN: OR BOOK OF GOVERNMENT AND LAW; SHOWING
THEIR HISTORY, NATURE AND NECESSITY 23 (3d ed. 1843).
24. See DANIEL ROSELLE, SAMUEL GRISWOLD GOODRICH, CREATOR OF PETER PARLEY, A
STUDY OF HIS LIFE AND WORK I (1968). Goodrich was phenomenally successful as a writer of books
for youths; he authored the Peter Parley books. See id.
25. GOODRICH, supra note 23, at 174.
26. Id. at 173 (quoting U.S. CONST. pmb1.).
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justice consists of applying law to facts, i.e., "measuring out what a man
may claim according to the laws of the land.,,27
Laws are general rules that govern society. Sometimes these rules
determine outcomes. Other times they grant people authority to determine
outcomes on their own. Legal methods are the way that legal systems
apply general rules of substantive law to specific cases. Sometimes they
direct what outcomes will be. Other times, however, they structure how
decision-makers acting on their own authority are to determine outcomes.
Legal methods take law from the initial formulation of rules in
legislatures or elsewhere through to the final application of rules to
individual cases. A complete program of legal methods addresses the legal
system, lawmaking, law-finding, and law-applying. 28 As used in this
Article, a legal system is a national organization of law. Lawmaking
includes legislation, but also judicial or administrative lawmaking. Lawfinding encompasses the interpretation of statutes and precedents; it
determines the specific rules that decide particular cases. Law-applying
takes those rules and applies them to facts to decide concrete cases. Lawapplying presupposes a way of fact-finding. Taken together, legal methods
should facilitate bringing rules and facts together to reach just results.
Schoolbook learning teaches that legal systems only approximate
justice. There is tension between justice and law. This tension is at the
heart of Schauer's observation that legal reasoning requires application of
rules notwithstanding that in particular cases the results may not be the
best possible decisions. In Schauer's world, legal methods exist to take
decisions away from decision-makers to bind them to decide in accordance
with less than optimal rules. In Zippelius' world, legal methods exist to
empower decision-makers to reach decisions on their own authority that
are as fair and just as possible, even if in a some instances rules do not
comply with this demand and the legal question cannot be solvedjustly.29

27. Id. at 23.
28. See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 18, at 521-27; James R. Maxeiner: Legal
Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 16 TULANE. 1. OF INT'L &
COMPo L. 541 (2007) [hereinafter Legal Certainty]; cf Stefan Vogenauer, Sources of Law and Legal
Method in Comparative Law, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 869 (Mathias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) ("[A] legal method typically answers the following
questions: (1) What is the style of lawmaking? (2) Who applies and interprets the law? (3) Which
factors are taken into account in the application and interpretation of the law? (4) How are these
factors ranked?'').
29. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 14.
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II. LESS THAN THE BEST? SCHAUER'S THINKiNG LIKE A LAWYER

1996 Internet Newsletter Publication 30

Mild rule skepticism is endemic among American jurists. Many,
perhaps most, contemporary American jurists, accept the aphorism that
"we are all realists now.,,31 By that, they mean, "we are sophisticated
professionals; we know that legal decisions have little to do with legal
rules.,,32 Schauer considers this common saying "almost certainly false.,,33
In his book, he seeks "to present a sympathetic treatment of the formal
side of legal thinking, and thus at least slightly to go against the grain of
much of twentieth- and twenty-first-century American legal thought.,,34 He
tells readers: "[r]ules actually do occupy a large part of law and legal
reasoning.,,35 He implores them: "[I]aw may not be all about rules, but it is
certainly a lot about rules .... ,,36

30. "Splash and Grab," SCHNEWS (May 17, 1996), http://www.schnews.org.uklarchive/news74
.htm.
31. Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 247 (2000) ("The slogan
'we are all realists now' is so well-accepted in North America (in particular in the United States) that
an unstated working assumption of most legal academics is that judicial explanations of a judgment
tell us little if anything about why a case was decided as it was.").
32. Id.
33. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 144.
34. Id. at xii.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id.; cf James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law: How They Might Do It, III
PENN STATE L. REV. 469 (2009) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law].
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Schauer, however, is half-hearted in his defense of legal reasoning; he
seems to be infected by rule skepticism himself. He acknowledges
widespread-and perhaps his own-uncertainty when he devotes his first
chapter to the question "Is there legal reasoning?,,37 Law may be a lot
about rules, but Schauer considers the popular conception that law is "a
collection of rules written down in a master rulebook" to be "highly
misleading.,,38 To the contrary, he says that "straightforward application of
existing rules [is] "far removed from the realities of actual practice.,,39 He
sees that general rules produce poor results in particular cases. 40 Instead of
seeing legal methods as opportunities to mediate between rules and facts
in order to bring better results in particular cases-as solutions in law
applying-he sees legal reasoning as the problem itself.
For Schauer, legal thinking requires a choice between a decision
according to law and doing the right thing. Already on the dust jacket of
Schauer's book we read that legal reasoning is about "following a rule
even when it does not produce the best result." By page 7 Schauer has told
us that "everyone of the dominant characteristics of legal reasoning and
legal argument can be seen as a route toward reaching a decision other
than the best all-things considered decision for the matter at hand." A
Greek chorus repeats the thought throughout his book. 41
Schauer says that legal reasoning produces less than the best results
because of law's generality:
Although disputes, in court and out, involve particular people with
particular problems engaged in particular controversies, the law
tends to treat the particulars it confronts as members of larger
categories. Rather than attempting to reach the best result for each
controversy in a wholly particularist and contextual way, law's goal
is often to make sure that the outcome for all or at least most of the
particulars in a given category is the right one. 42

37. SCHAUER, supra note I, at I. Nor is he alone; other American authors feel the same. See, e.g.,
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING, at xiii-xvi (I st ed. 1985).
The 2007 edition does not include this preface.
38. SCHAUER supra note I, at 103.
39. Id. at 13.
40. See. e.g., id. at 26, 120.
41. It appears over a dozen times. See, e.g., id. at 8, 9, 10, 11,30,31,32,36,41,43,61, 62, 64,
and 68.
42. Id. at 8. See also Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217,227-31
(2004) (discussing the inherent generality of rules); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES,
AND STEREOTYPES 300 (2003) (",Yet not only is generality not, in general, unjust, but justice itself may
involve considerable components of generality .... The good society is one in which generality is not
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At book's end, perhaps exhausted, Schauer tenders a melancholy apology
for rules:
At the heart of much of law's use of its characteristic reasoning
devices is its acceptance of the fact that the best decision is not
always the best legal decision. In operating in this fashion, law does
not intend to be perverse. It does, however, intend to take
institutional values especially seriously, and it does that in the hope
that in the long run we may be better off with the right institutions
than we are when everyone simply tries to make the best decision. 43
The same issues arise in other legal systems based on rules. 44 The puzzle is
to explain why Schauer sees American legal methods as often leading to
other than the best decisions while Zippelius does not see similar
consequences for German legal methods.
Schauer himself, in a recent article, The Failure of the Common Law,
points us in the direction of an explanation. There he contrasts "the central
role of the judge in the lawmaking process" in common law countries with
"the kind of highly precise canonical statement of the law much more
commonly associated with the civil law .... ,,45 He poses a puzzle whose
solution illuminates ours: "why, even in common law countries, the civil
law model seems so much in the ascendancy, and the common law model
seems so much in decline.,,46
In The Failure of the Common Law, Schauer describes the vision of the
common law model as starting from broad and vague directives which are
developed over time by those who are called upon to decide actual
controversies when they arise. 47 The laws so made may be avoided or
modified when the best resolution of the case so requires. The "constraints
of precedent [are] understood as secondary to the continuous efforts of
decision makers to reach the best results for the largest number of cases
,,48

Schauer describes the vision of the civil law to be "rules set forth in
advance in an accessible and precise canonical text which is expected to

only inescapable, but is also necessary for justice itself.").
43. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 233.
44. See, e.g., ZIPPELTUS, supra note 2, at xi ('The function of the law in offering solutions
capable of attaining consensus to questions of justice can also, however, come into conflict with the
strict obligation of the law.").
45. Frederick Schauer, The Failure of the Common Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 765, 765 (2004)
[hereinafter Schauer, The Failure of Common Law].
46. Id. at 772.
47. Id. at 770.

48. Id.
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provide a clear, even if not necessarily optimal in every case, resolution of
the vast majority of legal questions and human controversies.,,49 The hope
is that subsequent judicial involvement will be minimal. 50
As we shall see in Part III that Schauer's purposely simplified vision of
the civil law is only part of the story. It is true that statutes, particularly
codes, are to provide in advance general answers that fit most situations. It
is true that in those cases, judicial involvement is minimal. But it is also
recognized that statutes cannot anticipate every eventuality. Then law is
not expected to prescribe answers, but to assist decision makers in finding
solutions to problems. The law does not bind decision makers to nonoptimal decisions; rather it empowers them to decide on their own to reach
the best possible decisions.
Schauer solves his puzzle with four explanations. First, common law
decisionmaking empowers a group of people (i.e., judges) to make socially
important and largely unconstrained decisions. 51 Second, common law
lawmaking occurs in what may be unrepresentative cases. 52 Third,
common law judges recognize the costs of excess flexibility and control
themselves. 53 Fourth, as societies grow, the importance of the guidance
function of law becomes greater than the dispute resolution function. 54
Schauer's explanations have two common threads: concentration on
judges as lawmakers in litigation (the first three explanations) and
insufficient attention to those bound trying to follow the law (the fourth
explanation). More than two decades ago, he identified and said of these
threads, "Only in America.,,55

49. Id. at 772.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 777.
52. Id. at 778.
53. Id. at 779.
54. Id. at 781.
55. Frederick Schauer, Judging in a Corner, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (1988). "Only in
America,"' is the first sentence of the article. Schauer continued: "Although judges and judging occupy
an important place in the institutionalized legal systems of most modem cultures, only in the United
States could theories of law be so commonly conflated with theories of appellate adjudication." To
much the same eflect, see H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, II GA. L. REV. 969, 969 (1977).
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III. JUSTICE THROUGH METHODS: 56 ZIPPELlUS'S GERMAN LEGAL METHODS

Ius est ars bani et aequi.
"The law is the art of good order and justice."
Digests of Justinian, 1st book, 1st section, 1st paragraph 58
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide
for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
Preamble to the U.S. Constitution 59
Zippelius sees the tension that Schauer sees between rules and doing
the right thing, but Zippelius does not see law's rules and their application
as perverting best decisions. To the contrary, Zippelius presents law as

56. The header is borrowed from the title of a book about Karl Engisch, one of the best known
German legal-methods scholars of the generation prior to Zippelius. See ANDREAS MASCHKE,
GERECHTlGKETT DURCH METHODE: Zu KARL ENGISCHS THEORTE DES JURISTISCHEN DENKENS (1993).
57. 2 JAMES ROBINSON PLANCHE, A CYCLOPJEDIA OF COSTUME OR DICTIONARY OF DRESS 28
(1878).
58. DIG. 1.1.1 (Ulpian, Inst., I). The English translation is from ZIPPELTIJS, supra note 2, at 13
and is based on the similar German translation of the tenth German edition of Zippelius's book, "Das
Recht ist die Kunst der guten Ordnung und der Billigkeit.'· Alan Watson translates the maxim
differently: "the law is the art of goodness and fairness." I DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN I (Alan Watson ed.,
rev. ed. 2009). The difference in translation underscores the point that, for Zippelius, law is connected
with good order.
59. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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promoting a "solution to questions of justice.,,60 Doing justice is a "task"
of legal methods. 6l
Although justice is the principal task of law, it is not the only one.
Zippelius quotes from the beginning of Justinian's Digests: "Law is the art
of good order and justice.,,62 In addition to doing justice, law has the task
of meeting requirements of legal certainty and, optimally, of adequately
satisfying societal interests or what Americans call, policy.63
When they can, legislatures "predetermine" questions of justice and
policy.64 They do so in statutes that permit those subject to law to know
what law requires and to comply with it. When legislatures cannot
predetermine answers-and that is the case in many matters subject to
law-what they should do is rationally structure decisions. They can give
decision makers room to decide on their own authority. Legislatures may
circumscribe decision makers' authority by requiring specific substantive
criteria, by excluding certain concrete conclusions, by requiring particular
procedures and by demanding formal justification for decisions. Yet in all
these instances, law structures decisions without claiming to command
particular decisions. When law cannot answer definitively what should be
decided, it can answer who should decide using which criteria subject to
which process. In short, as Zippelius states, "the interpretation and
development of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured;
however, they are not completely capable of being rationally
determined.,,65
The world of American law that Schauer describes is two-dimensional.
It presents a decision-maker with a single binary choice: between
following a rule and doing the right thing. It is the world peculiarly that of
the American appellate judge, who is presented with facts determined
below and a legal issue posed by an appellant. The judge makes law

60. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 13.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. (emphasis added). He continues: "It's no accident that this maxim finds itself at the
beginning ofthe greatest and most influential work of jurisprudence."
63. Zippelius variously speaks of "competing interests" and "societal interests." Policy is a fair
translation. See JAMES R. MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST
LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12 (1986), also available as JAMES R. MAXEINER, RECHTSPOLlTlK
UND METHODEN 1M DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANISCHEN KARTELLRECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE
BETRACHTUNG (1986) [hereinafter MAxEINER, POLICY AND METHODS]. Although the term "legal
certainty" has fallen out of favor in American law, its meaning today is still readily understood. See
Maxeiner. Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 18, at 517-19.
64. See ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2. at 16 .
65. Id. at xii.
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intended to bind lower courts. To reach the best result in the one hard case
may require the judge to make bad law for future cases.
The world that Zippelius describes is multi-dimensional. In many
cases, what the law requires is clear. The only issue is a factual one: do the
instant facts fall under the statutory requirements? If they do, whether the
result is the best result is not an issue because the legislature has mandated
the result. In many instances, however, the result may not be clear. More
than one statute may compete for application. A single statute may leave
leeway in determining whether it applies. A statute may authorize the
decision maker to make a value judgment based on justice or on policy. A
statute may grant discretion as to which legal consequences are to apply.
In all of these instances, German legal methods help decision-makers
reach better results, meaning results that are both correct under the law and
that comport with general notions of justice or with sound policy.
Although decision-makers may not make decisions that contradict the law,
legal methods permit them, indeed direct them, to use these methods to
reach better results than they might otherwise reach. 66 In the world of
Zippelius, legal methods support, rather than hinder, compliance with law
and doing justice in individual cases.
In four principal chapters Zippelius explains how German legal
methods are used to legislate clear law or to facilitate the reaching of
correct and, hopefully, the best results when law is not clear. In the
remainder of this Article, I state what I hold to be among the most
important of his lessons for Americans interested in improving their own
legal methods. 67

66. GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLTK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASTC
LAW] art. 20(1), May 23,1949, BGBI. I, (Ger.); see also MAXEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 22
(describing the role of statutes in German law). Should decision-makers feel a law should be put out of
force, they are directed to the Federal Constitutional Court to seek that result. GG art. 93(1), ~ 2; see
also Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 28, at 597-98 (discussing the process to determine unclear
laws).
67. Zippelius gives his own succinct summary for Gennans in his Foreword:
Pursuant to the principles of separation of powers and legal certainty, it follows that the
law sets general norms that are binding upon administration and adjudication. Accordingly,
administrative and judicial bodies must detennine as a matter of principle, and according to
rules of interpretation, what the intent of these norms are; and, in so doing, they must abide
by that intent. At the same time, however, consideration must also be given to the principal
function of the law in providing just solutions to problems. Therefore, statutory interpretation
(interpretation of laws) must strive for fair solutions in line with what is linguistically and
logically possibly. The function of the law in offering solutions capable of attaining
consensus to questions of justice can also, however, come into conflict with the strict
obligation of the law. That happens when the statute, as interpreted according to the rules of
the art, apparently does not satisfY its function in serving justice. When, in such a case, the
grounds for doing justice outweigh the grounds for separation of powers and legal certainty-
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A. Concept and Function of the Law68
1. Law Consists of Rules
Law controls human behavior. 69 It motivates how people decide. The
law "does not describe facts, but prescribes conduct.,,70
Law consists of rules. Its rules "are instruments that bring order to
daily life.,,7l Rules are enforced by the state. Rules should be based on
general consensus if they are effectively to direct life. Zippelius teaches
that "voluntary compliance with norms, societal constraints or even the
mere threat of procedural enforcement are normally sufficient to allow the
legal order to function as a general orientation scheme."n Compulsion is
not always needed.
Voluntary compliance presupposes that those subject to law know what
the law requires. Self-application of law is a feature common to successful
legal systems.
Law is about obligations and it is about authorizations. According to
Zippelius, "The law ... consists of obligations to do something or refrain
from doing something, as well as rules regulating the creation,
modification and termination of behavioral norms or individual rights.,,73
When we think of law, we think first of obligations, such as stop at a red
light. But its authorizations are no less important: e.g., a traffic officer may
stop a motorist that the officer observes is not complying with traffic rules.
Authorizations take over when rules cannot direct solutions.
Legislatures cannot anticipate all eventualities; they cannot rationally predetermine what all outcomes will be. What they can do is to structure
authority and its exercise. Then they do not try to calibrate all choices in
advance. They let government officials or individuals subject to law make
essential choices. Usually, when legislatures give others leeway in

which speak for strict adherence to the wording of the statute-then supplementing or
correcting the statute is necessary.
With all this, the limits of methodical efforts become clear. Considerations structured
according to interpretation and rules of legal development boil down tin the end to nothing
more than dissoluble values and areas of leeway in decision-making. In short, the
interpretation and development of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured;
however they are not completely capable of being rationally determined.
ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at xi-xii (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 17.
72. Id. at 12.
73. Id. at II.
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deciding, they do not leave decision-makers free to decide without
limitation. Usually they require specific criteria or specific procedures for
those choices.
Zippelius says the organization of authority is the "backbone" of a
legal system's rational structure. 74 What he requires of a legal system is
that "the various institutional authorities must be arranged and ordered in
such a way that the norms and decisions they promulgate contribute to
consistent (conflict-free) and well-functioning behavioral organization."
German practice pays close attention to this requirement. It coordinates
federal and state legislation; it prefers decentralization through local
administration to decentralization through local legislation. Coordination
is easier when fewer bodies are allowed to make rules?5

2. The Primary Purpose of Law Is Justice
The primary task of law, Zippelius teaches, is "bringing about just
solutions to the problems that arise between people.,,76 That means that
law "must regulate human behavior in such a way that necessities and
encumbrances are distributed equitably, conflicting interests fairly
balanced [and] actions worthy of criminal liability justly punished .... ,,77
In the legislature, the people through their representatives decide what is
just and take affirmative steps to establish justice for all. The questions
they answer may be mundane ones, such as, when must sellers be
compelled to take back faulty products? Or they may determine issues
fundamental for a fair society, like when should free disposition of
property be limited in order to protect the weaker in society?78
Justice is not, however, the only task of law. "In addition to the task of
doing justice, there are the requirements of legal certainty, and optimally
and adequately satisfying competing interests.,,79 These latter tasks may
not involve justice. They may serve only a function of giving order. For an
example Zippelius gives the rule that on a highway, the right lane is the

74. Id. at 6.
75. See Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 28, at 562-67. The same challenges now arise in
the European Union in the requirements of a single European market consistent with demands of
decentralization through the principle of subsidiarity.
76. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 15.
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id. at 14.

79. Id.
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travel lane and the left lane the passing lane. 80 He describes this and
similar rules as "value-indifferent legal norms.,,81
Justice, legal certainty, and societal interests, Zippelius teaches, "stand
in a complex relationship: they can complement or they can run contrary
to each other.,,82 Law serves societal interests, but law should create a just
social order. 83 Rules seek legal certainty, but legal certainty serves justice
by inhibiting arbitrary unequal treatment. 84 Rules in their generality may
neglect the particularities of individual cases. 85 Legal certainty and justice
may come into conflict. 86 In cases of conflict, rules that serve only
interests of order are entitled to less weight than are rules that serve
justice. 87 Resolving the conflict is a significant part of the work of legal
methods.

3. Rules are Legislatively and Democratically Legitimated
Legislation is the dominant form of law. Zippelius teaches that
"[t]oday, as societal relations are regulated largely through legislation,
questions of justice arise predominantly in this area.,,88 The legislature
mediates among the demands of justice, legal certainty, and policy.
Legislation should seek, teaches Zippelius, "to create a just behavioral
order that sensibly weighs the interests of community participants against
one another.,,89
Those who apply the law are bound to the solution of the legislature
and to decisional criteria determined by it. In the former case, the
legislature has "pre-determined" justice and all people are bound by it. 90

80. Id. at IS.
81. Id. at 16.
82. Id. at 14. Gustav Radbruch, leading German legal philosopher of the first half of the
twentieth century, and Minister of Justice under Gustav Stresemann, is the person perhaps best
associated with this concept. See Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy § 9, in 4 THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABTN 109 (20th Century Legal Philosophy Series, Kurt
Wilk trans., 1950), ('"Legal certainty demands positivity, yet positive law claims to be valid without
regard to its justice or expediency [i.e., public policy] . . . . "); see also MAXE1NER, POLICY AND
METHODS, supra note 63, at 10-14.
83. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 14--15.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 14.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 14-15.
88. Id. at IS. While rules are predominately statutory, Zippelius allows for judge-made law in
other systems. In his own system he allows for judicial legal development to make rules more precise a
choice that has been left open and to fill in gaps. He allows for judge-made rules in other systems
89. Id. at IS.
90. Id. at 16 (,"Accordingly, even questions of justice are predetermined by the legislature.").
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That binding, however, assumes that the issue is unambiguously decided
in the case at hand.
When the legislature has not decided an issue, or when that decision in
an individual case is not unambiguously determined, then legal methods
help in finding the best solution. That does not mean that decision-makers
look to their individual consciences. Legitimacy demands otherwise.
Practical legitimacy requires that "questions of justice are decided
according to concepts of justice that are capable of majority consensus,
rather than very individual ideas and concepts.,,91 Zippelius gives three
grounds for this view: the "democratic notion," "equal treatment" and
"legal certainty.,,92 A democratic society permits broad participation in
society and expects judges to follow prevalent beliefs. 93 Equal treatment
requires that judges use standards that enjoy broad consensus in society
and are not dependent on particular judges. 94 Legal certainty requires
following the same course or, an American might say, valuing precedent. 95
Determining what is a concept of justice capable of majority consensus
is a difficult standard to apply. Consensus should not be equated with the
ostensible opinion of the majority, since these views often are determined
by matters other than conscience. Where legal terms leave leeway in
regard to their meaning, decision-makers can and should give preference
to interpretations that lead to more just solutions. 96
Looking to democratic legitimation, Zippelius answers two general
issues necessary to understand legislation. Zippelius teaches that statutes
should be understood objectively, that is, according to "the intention of the
statute itself.,,97 An objective interpretation seeks an understanding
"familiar to the mindset of a wide number of people.,,98 Relying on his
theory of the state, Zippelius rejects the idea that statutes should be
interpreted subjectively, i.e., according to the intention of those who
drafted them. 99 A subjective interpretation sees statutes as binding
statements that have their bases in the individual wills of those who took
part in the legislative process. In a tyrannical state, such as Germany was
between 1933 and 1945, that is the will of the leader (" Willen des

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 32.
Jd.at 32. Zippelius is known for his many publications on the philosophy of the state. See.
e.g., REINHOLD ZIPPELlUS, GESCHICHTE DER STAATSIDEEN (10th ed. 2003).
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Fiihrers,,).lOO In a democratic state, such as Germany is today, a subjective
interpretation is practically excluded. Those who adopt a statute are
numerous. Their individual wills are difficult to determine and are unlikely
. harmony WIt. h one another. 101
to be In
Zippelius teaches that statutes should be interpreted according to ideas
of the present ("living interpretation") and not according to ideas
controlling at the time they were adopted ("interpretation at the time of
inception,,).102 He argues that "[t ]he basis of legitimacy of law to be
applied today does not lie in the past; it lies in the present. ... For the
present it does not matter under whose authority the statute was enacted,
but rather under whose authority it lives on today.,,103 For that reason
German ministries of justice are responsible for removing from the statute
books obsolete laws. Some newer German laws as adopted automatically
. 104
expIre.
The concept and function of law among Americans is little different
from that among Germans. The school book writer referenced above could
have been quoting Justinian's Digest when he wrote: "Civil Government is
that system of laws, whether written or printed or transmitted by custom,
which is established to secure and promote justice and order."los We the
people of the United States declare in the Preamble of our Constitution
that our State exists "to establish justice [and to] insure domestic
tranqUl'1'Ity. ,,106
Justice Scalia reminds Americans, that the rule of law is a law of
rules. l07 Legislation has been dominant in the United States in practice, if
not in law professors' theories, for over a century. Common law with little
legislation, says Scalia "is now barely extant.,,108 Schauer concedes that
"[t]his image of the common law has no real-world instantiations.,,109

100. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 3l.
101. Id. at 33.
102. Id. at 34.
103. Id. at 34, 35. While considerations of legitimacy and of justice demand a living
interpretation, Zippelius teaches that considerations of separation of powers (and we might add, of
legal certainty), require that "a change in meaning must not only keep itself within the possible
meanings of the text of a legal norm, but also, where possible, within that very range of meaning that
the purpose of the legislation leaves open for honing in on." Id. at 36.
104. OECD, BETTER REGULATION TN EUROPE: GERMANY, 114-15 (2010), available at http://
www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_34141_45048895_1_1_1_I,OO.html.
105. GOODRICH, supra note 23, at 42 (first emphasis in the original; second emphasis added).
106. CONST. pmbl.
107. Antonin Scalia, The Rule ofLaw as a Law of Rules, S6 IJ. CHI. L. REV. 11"15, 1175 (1989).
108. Antonin Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith's Law's Quandary, 55 CATH. u.L. REv. 687, 689
(2006) [hereinafter Review].
109. SCHAUER, supra note I, at 105. Yet American jurists, Schauer included, persist in teaching,
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Voluntary compliance presupposes that those subject to the law know
what the law requires. The common law cannot do that. It has been dubbed
"the sublime of incomprehensibility."llo Were Americans to take
rulemaking seriously, they would consistently adopt statutes that peopleor at least people's lawyers-could understand with reasonable certainty.
Scalia reminds us that Americans are not there yet. To the contrary, he
challenges legislators not to accept a multiplication of imprecise laws and
~
I
' IatlOn.
' III
LUZZY
egIs
In our preoccupation with adjudication and lawmaking through
adjudication we have failed to establish reliable techniques for making
better laws. Our lack of attention to the organizing side of law has left us
with scores of competing laws that do not mesh with one another. We
have long known of the importance of coordination for laws, but have
done little to act on that knowledge. 1 12
American practice lacks a backbone of institutional coordination. It
foregoes opportunities to structure decision-making to permit decisionmakers to search for best solutions for this case. It is premised on the
assumption that each legislature has provided the right answer to a legal
problem beforehand. Each appellate court finds itself choosing, as Schauer
notes, between a solution it sees as mandated by present law and a solution
it deems better for the majority of future cases.
Case law lacks opportunity and legitimacy to provide needed rules.
Schauer notes that it can only deal with cases presented to it and these
cases may not be representative. Case law, he notes, is made by judges
who do not have legitimacy to make rules generally. When case law goes
beyond filling the interstices of precedent or statute, it goes too far.
Similarly Scalia rejects robust case law. Government, he says, draws its
authority from the consent of the governed. A democracy is "quite
incompatible with the making (or the 'finding') of law by judges .... ,,113

to the near exclusion of modern legal methods, a legal method that is not of this world. Perhaps out of
nostalgia they seek to resuscitate A Common Law for the Age of Statutes. See generally GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
110. JAMES KIRKE PAULDING, The Perfection of Reason, in THE MERRY TALES OF THE THREE
WISE MEN OF GOTHAM 105, 128 (2d ed., 1839).
Ill. Sykes v. United States, _ U.S. _,131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011).
112. See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION: AN ESTIMATE OF
RESTRICTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE FACTORS 225 (1917) [hereinafter FREUND, STANDARDS] (referring
to "correlation" of laws); see also Ernst Freund, Prolegomena to a Science of Legislation, 13 ILL. L.
REV. 264, 268 (1918) [hereinafter Freund, Prolegomena] (urging advancement of systematic
legislation).
113. Scalia, Review, supra note 108, at 689. Much to the same effect, see Hart, supra note 55, at
971 (finding the robust form of case law sometimes asserted in America to be "particularly hard to
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B. Legal Rules Consist of Syllogisms that Work Together

Zippelius teaches that legal rules are logical syllogisms that work
together. They are made up of major premises (law), minor premises
(facts), and conclusions (legal consequences).114 Their application is
deductive. ll5 He stresses the importance of minding a strict relationship
between the particular factual attributes required by a rule and the legal
consequence that it prescribes. All of the individual factual attributes of a
rule must be present for the legal consequence to apply; if only one IS
missing, the legal consequence does not attach. 116
The strict relationship between factual reqUIsites and legal
consequences has great importance for legal certainty guidance and for
legal process efficiency.1I7 Once it is clear that a single required factual
attribute is not present, there is no need to be concerned whether that
particular rule applies.1I8 There is no need to look for other factual
attributes of that rule.119 If that is the only rule that comes into
consideration, legal process can end. '20
Syllogisms are how legislation orders decision-making. It assigns
decisions to particular persons; it may allow those charged with deciding
room for judgment as whether the law applies or it may grant them
discretion in what action to take if they determine that the law does apply.
Syllogisms may be simple, such as "all men are mortal, Socrates is a
man, so Socrates is mortal." Or they may be complex: they may require
that factual requisites be taken from a number of individual provisions and

justifY in a democracy'"). This idea is not new to America. See. e.g., WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES
OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 378 (7th ed., 1st Am. ed. Philadelphia, 1788) ("The first
maxim of a free state is, that the laws be made by one set of men, and administered by another; in
other words, that the legislative and judicial characters be kept separate.''), For Paley's importance in
America and in early American law, see Wilson Smith, William Paley's Theological Utilitarianism in
America, II WM. & MARY Q. (3d SERIES) 402 (1954). Schauer implicitly acknowledges the point
when he explains that the failure of the common law results from public discomfort with empowering
judges to make decisions about deeply contested social ideas and judicial discomfort in accepting it.
114. See ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 39-43.
115. See id.
116. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 43, 110 ("Rules are norms that are either applied or not applied in
a particular case.").
117. Unless specifically authorized by the rule, there is no room for balancing tests that are
commonly utilized by American courts. See. e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in
the Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 109, 119, 174 (2003)
[hereinafter Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting].
118. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 43.

119. Id.
120. The same idea is present in American motions to dismiss cases either on pleadings or
dismissal on summary judgment.
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joined together. Zippelius terms incorporation by reference use of
supplementary provlSlons. Supplementary prOVISIOns simplity by
increasing legal certainty not only in lawmaking, but in application,
including in self-application, of law. At first glance, this might seem
counterintuitive: would it not be easier to read in one place all the
necessary requisites of a rule? Often, however, more than one rule may
apply to a given factual complex. By using supplementary provisions, the
same requisite can apply throughout all cases. In Germany, statutes have
"general parts" that regulate questions common to more than one of the
substantive matters they address. Conflicts of rules are reduced. Without
incorporation by reference, in every rule it would be necessary to build in
all the different exceptions and modifications one might think of.
Good legislation avoids conflicts among legal rules. Not only should it,
Zippelius teaches that good order demands that it must. He writes: "If
norms regulating behavior are to provide legal tranquility and a guarantee
of helping the citizen orient his or her behavior, then they may not
contradict [an Jother; in fact they must complement one another." He gives
half a dozen examples of how the German legal system writes rules to
avoid conflicts. 121 It is a simple point: self-application of law is impossible
when law demands contradictory behavior.
Syllogisms are at the heart of American law. 122 Justice Scalia advises
lawyers who want to persuade judges: "Think syllogistically.,,123 Judges
instruct jurors to apply law syllogistically to facts jurors find. Law schools
teach students the syllogistic elements of causes of action; bar examiners
examine on those syllogisms; lawyers bring lawsuits on the basis of
elements of causes of action.

121. I list six legal norms that are familiar to Americans:
(a) The law avoids a conflict by explicitly excluding its application in certain instances where
otherwise there would be conflict.
(b) The law avoids a conflict by permitting multiple norms to apply cumulatively.
(c) The conflict is resolved by applying only one norm through a choice based on a rule of
specialty, i.e., the more specific provision applies.
(d) The conflict is resolved by applying the higher level norm (e.g., the Constitution over
statute, federal statute over state statute, etc.).
(e) The conflict is resolved by applying the statute adopted later in time.

(f) The apparent conflict is resolved by interpreting statutes to avoid a conflict.

See ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 51-57.
122. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 2,19-20,67-70 (1996).
123. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 41 (2008).
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What ails American legal methods is not an absence of syllogisms, but
presence of too many poor ones that do not fit together well. American
syllogisms are expected to be simple. Simple syllogisms can ignore
important variations of life. A complex syllogism is a generalization that
does not ignore features that justifY a departure from the general rule. 124
Complex syllogisms, however, demand lawmakers who can write them
and law-appliers who can apply them.
American syllogisms are simple so that lay jurors can apply them.
Although jurors are instructed in syllogisms, no reasonable lawyer
believes that most jurors are able to and do follow instructions closely in
any but the simplest of cases. To deal with these infirmities trial lawyers
long ago shifted their attentions from syllogisms to what they call the
"theory of the case.,,125
Creating complex syllogisms practically compels complex lawmaking
procedures that are not standard in the United States. While writing an
isolated syllogism is within the capability of a competent lawyer, writing a
syllogism that fits well with all of the other syllogisms in the legal system
is a challenge that often is beyond the capability of anyone person. A
single legislator is no more able to write suitable laws than is a single
judge. For over a century elsewhere in the world, responsibility for the
drafting of laws has been located outside of the legislature itself. An
institution, commonly a ministry of justice, is supposed to see to it that
new syllogisms coordinate well with old ones. All of this has long been
126
known in the United States, if little appreciated.
Both the American
Law Institute and the Uniform Laws Commission are efforts to deal with
the problem. They lack neither skill in drafting nor process to develop
such syllogisms. What these national and similar state institutions lack is
political clout to get the laws that they propose enacted.
C. Statutes are Interpreted to Solve Legal Problems

Statutes and other legal rules put ideas into words. Words make ideas
communicable and give them fixed form. The words of statutes serve legal
certainty. They guide people in how to act; they control those charged with
carrying out statutes. Words are, however, ambiguous; they may refer to

124. Contra The Failure of the Common Law, supra note 45, at 778 ('"[T]he generalizations that
best suit large classes of particulars are generalizations that ignore feature-even relevant ones-of
particular cases. ").
125. MAXETNER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 131.
126. FREUND, STANDARDS, supra note 112, at 225; Freund, Prolegomena, at 268.
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more th an one concept. 127 U n d erstand'mg a statute means assocmtmg
correct concepts with statutes' words. People cannot apply rules-to
themselves-or to others, if they do not know which concepts apply in the
context of concrete cases.
Zippelius explains that words that describe facts seldom carry the same
meaning for everyone. A given word has a "range of meanings.,,128 That
does not make the word wholly uncertain. The limit of the range of
meanings of the word limits the range of interpretations of statutes using
the word. For example, a statute that applies only to cats might be
interpreted to apply to tigers but cannot, consistent with the meaning of its
words, apply to dogS. 129 Within the range, there may be many possible
meanings; it is the task of interpretation to identifY the correct meaning. 130
To identify which meaning yields the correct interpretation Zippelius
uses the four "classical" interpretative criteria of German law:
"grammatical," "logical," "historical" and "systemic.,,131 We need not
expound on these criteria here; Zippelius explains them lucidly. 132
From the standpoint of legal certainty and predictability, a range of
meanings is a drawback. Zippelius argues, however, that such latitude is
often an advantage: it gives law flexibility. "This range of meaning allows
these general legal words to adapt to the wide and diverse range of legal
problems and circumstances of life that the law seeks to regulate, as well
as to the changing prevalent social-ethical views.,,133 Legislatures do this
deliberately when they use what are known as general clauses. 134
The classical criteria of interpretation, while they facilitate finding the
correct interpretation, do not give license to go outside the range of
possible meanings of a statute's words. Zippelius explains: "All further

127. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 28. Anyone who has studied a foreign language knows this.
128. Id. at 62-66.
129. See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50
(2009) (a tiger may be a cat, but not a dog); SCHAUER, supra note 2, at 155 (a cat or bat is not a dog).
For H.L.A. Hart's famous discussion of interpretation, see American Jurisprudence Through English
Eyes, supra note 55.
130. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 67.
131' Id. at 60. Zimmermann likewise puts forward four classical interpretive criteria of German
law, also drawn from Savigny, but with somewhat different designations. See Reinhard Zimmermann,
Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Perspective, 56
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 315, 320 (1997) ('" (I) the literal meaning of the words or the grammatical structure
of a sentence, (2) the legislative history, (3) the systematic context and (4) the design, or purpose, of a
legal rule." (citing 1 FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS 206
(1840) (translated as SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN LAW (William Holloway trans., 1979) (1867»).
132. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 59-62.
133. Id. at 66.
134. For example, requirements for good faith in contract performance.
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efforts at interpretation proceed on the basis of a word's possible meaning.
These efforts are carried out within a range of meaning that is permissible
according to linguistic usage (possibly circumscribed by legal
definitions ).135 To go outside the range of possible meanings creates a
legitimacy problem; 136 it is to take over the function reserved to the
legislature. 137 The text then, is not the end, but it is an end.
Zippelius teaches that interpretation is argumentative. That is, from
among a range of possible meanings, all of which are more or less
representable, one must be selected. 138 "When interpretive arguments
conflict, there is no strictly rational hierarchy between them.,,139 "In
choosing a particular meaning, it is necessary to justity the choice-that is,
provide reasons for choosing it.,,140 The most important criterion is
"[w]hich of the possible 'justifiable' interpretations, according to the rules
of the art, lead to the most just solution?,,141 Interpretation is thus case
"result-oriented.,,142 It is not creation of new rules for future cases.
In Germany court interpretations of statutes, like court decisions
generally, are not binding (no doctrine of "statutory precedent"). At the
first instance level, judges are to orient interpretation on the legislative
language. Their judgments are to address issues of statutory interpretation
only to the extent necessary to decide cases before them.
That is not to say that judges ignore precedential values. Judges in the
first instance pay attention to appellate court interpretations of statutes if
only because they do not like to be reversed. At all levels judges interpret
statutes aware of possible general applicability. Zippelius explains: "Since
an interpretation capable of generalization is sought here, there is a focus
on results by way of categorization that goes beyond the circumstances of
the individual case. However, even here the dependence of a legal decision
on the particular facts is clear.,,143 As a result:
interpretations and gap-fillers, once chosen by courts, attain a
certain binding character; this follows from the principles of equal

135. Id. at 67.
136. Id. at 96.
137. Cj id. at 72.
138. Zippelius quotes the Federal Constitutional Court: "Interpretation ... has the attributes of a
discourse, in which even methodically unobjectionable work yields no absolutely correct statements
welcomed without doubt or reservation by all experts." Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 86.
140. Id. at 67.
141. Id. at 86.
142. See id. at 84.
143.Id.at84.
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treatment and legal certainty . ... [O]nce an interpretation or gapfiller is chosen, and it is justified with the latitudes allowed
hermeneutically, it may not be overruled without good reason. 144
Interpretation does not always reach just solutions. 145 This does not
invariably require that judges give up seeking just and fair solutions.
Sometimes interpretation fails because the law provides no answer. In
such cases statutes require supplementation, either through future
legislation or through judicial gap-filling of existing law. 146 In filling in
gaps, it is appropriate to consider societal goals, system consistency and
justice. 147 Gap-filling to achieve material justice, raises the question
whether supplementation should be done politically, for the future by the
legislature, or according to existing law, by judges. Zippelius warns that
[b]y supplementing the law, the judge is functioning in a manner reserved
for the legislature under a system of separation of powers. The legislature
is in a better position than a court to tackle questions of legal
supplementation---considerations that are often highly political in natureand it does so with more democratic legitimacy, particularly with respect
to the necessary debate and conversation with the public. 148
Other times, a statute fails to achieve justice because the answer it
provides is unacceptable. The statute needs correction. Correcting statutes
is more controversial than filling gaps. It is easier from the standpoint of
legitimacy for courts to act when the legal text provides no answer than
when it provides a bad answer. Article 20(3) of the German Constitution
challenges judges to be alert to a need to correct the legislature in the
interest of justice. It provides: "Legislation is subject to the constitutional
order; the executive and the judiciary are bound by law and justice.,,149
Nevertheless, on grounds of separation of powers and legal certainty,
departing from a law's text is justified only by "overwhelming reasons of

144. Id. at 110-11. The binding nature is not, he says, that which the '·strict doctrine of 'stare
decisis'" of Anglo-American law asserts over inferior courts, but rather that which common law
appellate courts apply to their own decisions: "not departing from like decisions without very good
reasons." Id. at 112 (citing D. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 227
(1978)).
145. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 17. Cfail to reach ajust solution that satisfies a certain sense of
the law;" in the Gennan original, '·nicht zu einer gerechten, das RechtsgefUhl befriedigenden Lasung
fuhren'').
146. Id. at 17.
147. Id. at 97.
148. Id. at 91.
149. GG art. 20(3); AxEL TSCHENTSCHER, THE BASIC LAW (GRUNDGESETZ): THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 28 (2d ed. 2008).
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justice.,,150 Then there are but two possibilities. If the text leaves open the
possibility that the particular problem was not considered, the court may
decide the issue. If, on the other hand, the text clearly applies, the court
may not put the statute out of force. What the court can and should do, is
to refer the case to the Federal Constitutional Court, which has the
exclusive authority to invalidate law. 151
Zippelius' description of interpreting statutes is deceptively familiar for
Americans: "Interpreting a statute means ascertaining the meaning of the
words found within a legal text, namely the facts, values, and prescriptive
ideas that these words seek to describe.,,152 He adds "[w]e wouldn't be far
off in our result today if ... we were to formulate the view, according to
which the goal of interpretation is to determine what the ideas of the
legislator were ... .,,153 That could be the beginning of an American book
on statutory interpretation; indeed, it practically is. ls4 His discussion of the
four classical interpretative criteria of German law could be a discussion
of what are known in America as canons of statutory interpretation. 155
There is, however, one little noted but critical difference between
German and American practices of statutory interpretation. This difference
helps answer our puzzle of why legal methods in America seem to work
against just decisions but facilitate them in Germany.
In Germany, statutory interpretation is primarily an aid in lawapplying. It helps those subject to the law, and those who must apply law
to others to understand the factual requisites the law requires and correctly
to classifY behavior within an existing system. For Zippelius, "continued
legal development" through statutory interpretation is secondary 'to
finding the appropriate interpretation or gap-fillers for the individual
case.,,156 Appellate decisions interpreting statutes are not strictly binding
on lower courts, which may, for good reasons stated, depart from them. ls7
In every case, decision-makers start from statutory texts.

ISO.
lSI.
152.
153.

ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 113.
Id. at 92 (referencing decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court).
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
154. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
OF THE LAWS 1 (2d ed. 1911) ("Interpretation, as applied to written law, is the art or process of
discovering and expounding the intended signification ofthe language used, that is, the meaning which
the authors ofthe law designed it to convey to others.").
155. Cj CROSS, supra note 129.
156. ZIPPELIUS at 111. For continued legal development generally, see MATTHIAS KLATT,
MAKING THE LAW EXPLICIT: THE NORMA TlVITY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT ATlON (2008), being a
translation with additional material of his THEORIE DER WORTLAUTGRENZE. SEMANTISCHE
NORMATIVITAT IN DERJURISTISCHEN ARGUMENTATION (2004)
157. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 108, 110-12. In one of his few comparative comments, here
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In the United States, on the other hand, statutory interpretation is part
of lawmaking. 158 It is used by courts of last resort to declare what the law
requires and to control what lower courts later do. For Schauer, making
decisions in individual cases amounts to making prospective rules; those
rules should reach "the best results for the largest number of cases.,,159
Appellate decisions interpreting statutes are binding on lower courts, who
may not deviate from them. The doctrine is known as "statutory
precedent." So strongly is it held that commonly lower courts in applying
statutes begin their process of reasoning from a higher court's precedent
interpreting a statute rather than from the statute itself. 160
Remarkable about this difference is that it produces results that are
contrary to American prejudices about Continental civil law. Americans
think of Continental civil law as providing detailed solutions that foreclose
judicial flexibility.161 In fact, often it is just the reverse. The German
system comes off as flexible and concerned with equitable outcomes in
individual cases, while it is the American system that is rigid and rulebound. It is American judges who, must choose between the rule-bound
decision and the "right" decision.
The doctrine of statutory precedent is sometimes seen as judges taking
over a lawmaking function more properly belonging to the legislature. The
doctrine gives the appellate court the last word on a statute until the
legislature acts again. In effect, the appellate court becomes "a political
competitor with the legislator in the creation of law.,,162
Although some American judges enjoy the power that statutory
precedent gives them, it is likely that their motives in adopting it were
more benign. It is one way, Schauer would say, for judges to control

Zippelius distinguishes German practice from common law stare decisis. Id.
158. It is not uncommon for legislative compromise to leave important issues for decision by
courts later.
159. Schauer, The Failure of Common Law, supra note 45, at 770,779.
160. See Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and Statutes, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 225, 231 (1999).
But see SCHAUER at 158 (,,[T]he words of a statute are almost always the starting point .... ").
161. Schauer himself speaks of a "highly precise canonical statement of the law." See text at note
45 supra.
162. See Strauss, supra note 160, at 244-45. Zippelius, were he confronted with the doctrine,
almost surely would find it "assuming a function reserved to the legislature-the institution, under a
state system of separation of powers, that is more competent than the courts to make such legal and
political decisions." ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 72 (condemning judicial definition of undefined
statutory terms beyond that necessary to decide the case or to make changes in the law). He continues:
"Legislative and parliamentary bodies typically have at their disposal better sources of information,
and as such, they make decisions through the necessary debate and consultation of the public, in
accordance with the democratic controls necessary for all political decision-making processes." Id.
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themselves. 163 It is at the same time extension of a conventional elderly
doctrine, precedent, to an area that now in the present is the focus of
judicial activity. The doctrine of statutory precedent responds to a need of
American litigating lawyers for certainty in preparing their cases.
American procedure systems assign to lawyers principal responsibility for
preparing cases for decision: it is up to the lawyers to present evidence
material to the issues defined by a cause of action. If statutory language is
unclear, lawyers want clear judicial guidance before they investigate the
case and present it to the court. 164 Statutory precedent gives them that
guidance even if it forecloses interpretations that might be more likely to
produce justice in individual cases. This same need explains why in
America, instead of flexible standards of interpretation such as the classic
interpretative criteria applied argumentatively, we have been inclined to
treat interpretation itself as rule-based. In our history we have seen canons
of construction, a Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act, a proposed
Restatement of Statutory Interpretation,165 and a proposed Federal Rule of
Statutory Interpretation. 166
American appellate procedure magnifies the effects of the doctrine of
statutory precedent. In America findings of fact in first instance normally
bind appellate courts. They have little opportunity to revise them. They do
have control over law. Their decisions about law change law. When faced
with a decision below that they find unjust, if they cannot find a way to
reverse proceedings and return the case for reconsideration, they are
tempted to change the law to get the right result. Hence, we say, "hard
cases make bad law."
Much the same effect is apparent even in the first instance. There, the
passivity of the trial court judge with respect to facts leaves development
of facts to the lawyers themselves. While it might be true that further
factual explanation would eliminate or ameliorate issues of statutory
interpretation, the judicial ethic of passivity makes exploration of those
facts difficult.

163. Schauer, The Failure of Common Law, supra note 45, at 779.
164. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.D. L. REv. 635, 641, 644 (1989). This is
not a critical issue in Gennany since issues remain open until the last oral hearing. See MAXETNER,
FAILURES, supra note 8, at 182-83.
165. Gary E. O'Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 N.YD. 1. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'y 333,335 (2003).
166. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, liS
HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002) (discussing diflerent strategies to structure statutory interpretation in the
form of rules).
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In Germany, on the other hand, appellate procedure encourages courts
to find the best possible decisions. The first appeal is focused-as is the
initial proceeding-on the best answer for this case. If it finds the decision
below unjust it may take further evidence. It then concludes on the basis of
this evidence that the law should be applied differently or that a different
law applies.
In the United States, discussions of statutory interpretation are less
about how lower courts should decide cases and more about whether
appellate courts can be controlled in their development of law. "Central to
the analysis," it is said, "is the concern that judges will be willful and
outcome oriented in their decisions. This means that they choose the result
that they prefer and then manipulate the legal materials to support that
result.,,167 The result that is feared, is not the equitable result in the
individual case, but the legislative result for future cases.
In other words, statutory interpretation in the United States is
principally an issue of binding and controlling courts. In Germany, on the
other hand, statutory interpretation is principally an issue of guiding
decision makers at all levels to optimal solutions of legal problems.
D. Applying Law Brings Facts and Law Together

Application of law to facts requires that law and facts be brought
together. The vehicle is the legal syllogism: the law is the major premise,
facts are the minor premise, and the legal consequences follow. Zippelius
teaches that applying the syllogism is the easy part. The part that can be
difficult is the discovery and definition of applicable law and the
determination of material facts. He advises colorfully: "legal decisions
will be found playing a musical ensemble of premise searching, premise
restricting, and premise establishment as well as formal logical
thinking.,,168
The problem that Zippelius addresses and that German legal methods
deal with is the interdependency of law and facts. Until one knows the
applicable rules, one does not know which facts are material. But until one
knows the facts, one does not know which rules are applicable. Settle the
applicable rules too soon, and facts may be overlooked which would
change results were other rules applied. Fail to settle the applicable rules

167. CROSS, supra note 129, at ix.
168. ZIPPELIUS. supra note 2, at 117. Zippelius quotes the German philosopher Schopenhauer: "to
find the premises is the difliculty, and there we leave logic behind us." Id.
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soon enough and the process may detour to find facts that are not material
under the rules actually applied.
In most cases of daily life, the interdependency of law and fact is not a
problem. Which rules apply is clear, the party subject to them knows the
facts and applies the rules to him or herself. As matters get more complex,
or the applicable rules less certain, the party subject to them may need
legal counsel. If other parties are involved, and if they have different views
of applicable law or material fact, and negotiation, mediation or litigation
may become necessary to bring law and facts together. Self-application is
facilitated by clear rules that require easily ascertainable facts.
When parties differ on results, "[t]he court applies legal norms as rules
to established facts.,,169 The establishment of the facts is for the parties.
The court knows the law (iura novit curia); the parties know the facts.
Once the parties have established the facts, the court can determine their
rights (da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius-give me the facts; I will give you
right). The process is interactive and interdependent. Parties and courts
cooperate. 170
Bringing law and facts together begins with the exchange of pleadings
and occurs in nearly every case. The court meets with the parties and
discusses which legal rules may govern the case, their material elements
and which of those elements are in dispute. Where different rules are
considered, the court may make a preliminary choice among them. The
judge directs proceedings to those matters material to decision and III
dispute. Zippelius describes how this works:
The changing allocation between norm and factual behavior usually
takes place in a 'back and forth wandering glance' (Engisch) among
many of the steps of an advanced selection, which means that in
continually eliminating irrelevant norms, application possibilities
and facts, one begins with mostly just an approximate allocation
from the larger area of test worthy norms, applicable alternatives
and circumstances of fact that are considered. l7l
There is no presentation of a case. Instead, "it may be necessary to pose
questions in a series of stages, feeling one's way toward the relevant
catalogue of norms, whereby at each step we consider and compare the
facts of the case to the legal consequence.,,172

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 124.
See MAxEINER, FAILURES, supra note 8, at 177-78.
ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 121-22.
Id. at 119-20.
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In American parlance, what the German judge is doing is narrowing
issues. The judge is searching to find and define the relevant legal norms
that he or she is to apply to the facts to be established. For each possible
rule, the judge determines which elements of the rule are material to the
case and which are in dispute between the parties. Unlike the American
process issue-narrowing in Germany is on-going and continues until the
very end of the process. There is no need ever to settle on one or more
issues as determinative. The court is never to decide any issue without the
parties knowing that that decision is imminent and having an opportunity
to take a position on it. When the applicability of all potential norms is
determined, the court gives its decision and, within a short time, justifies it
in a formal judgment.
Because the court determines issues of proof, there are no rules of
evidence such as Americans know. German courts take evidence and give
it such probative value as they believe that it deserves. This is what
American judges often do in bench trials. Zippelius writes of "The
Judicial Establishment of Facts in Particular.,,173 He tells us how "[t]he
judge decides whether the required degree of probability exists, basically
infree consideration of evidence." I 74
German legal methods avoid many of the risks of contest-oriented legal
process. Cases should not fail because advocates overlook applicable rules
or essential elements to rules. Opportunities to mislead decision-makers or
leave decision-makers with unanswered questions are reduced when
decision-makers and advocates work together in bringing law and fact
together.
German legal methods affirmatively provide avenues for decision
makers to find their way to just decisions. They are not compelled to make
binary choices between unjust legal decisions and best results. If an
outcome seems wrong, they can get a better understanding of the facts by
asking the parties to present more information. That may call for a
different outcome under the same rule, under a different rule or under a
general clause.175

173. Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 129.
175. The American Cappalli criticizes this practice as "massaging the facts." RICHARD B.
CAPPALLI, THE AMERTC AN COMMON LAW METHOD 188 (1997). He prefers the common law approach
that permits courts to "move the rules toward the facts." Id. at 187.
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1. RoomforJudgment in Finding Factual Prerequisites

Carefully crafted rules are not always sufficient to reach just decisions.
To facilitate just decisions in individual cases where statutes cannot
preprogram them, statutes extend to decision-makers both room for
judgment and discretion.
Room for judgment occurs when a statute uses a term with an
indefinite meaning. Zippelius gives as an example of room for judgment
the term "forest." Is a "small, free-standing, natural pine woods with
approximately 50 half-grown trees" a forest?,,'76 Suppose the requisite
element for a crime of arson is setting fire to a forest. Classifying this
stand of trees as a forest is for Zippelius preeminently a question of
interpreting the statute and not one of subsuming the facts under the
statute. In so doing, that interpretation then gives "meaning for future
cases.,,177 In other words, the specific case "gives the impetus to weigh and
to make precise the range of the meaning of the norm-with regard to the
submitted facts of behavior.,,178 This is yet another example of the
interdependency of law and facts: giving the norm substance "takes place
with reference to the extant reality of life in a 'back and forth wandering
glance' between the norm and those facts of behavior relevant to the norm
(§ 1411).,,179 The legislature has left the combining of the different norms,
i.e., whether this sort of group of trees falls with the range of the definition
of forest, to "institutional legal thinking.,,18o
A general clause is one that depends on an indefinite legal concept as
the operative provision. German statutes use general clauses to take into
account the many sides of life that do not lend themselves to definition in
clearly defined concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be
fragmentary, but can be gap free. 181

176. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 2, at 131. Note that in this subchapter Zippelius discusses indefinite
terms that are descriptive, such as "forest.'· Elsewhere he has already discussed indefinite terms that
include a valuing element, e.g., ·'negligently."
177. Id.
178. Id. at 132.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 133 (citations omitted).
181. KARL ENGISCH, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS JURlSTISCHE DENKEN 124. German indefinite legal
concepts are best known in the United States through two general clauses of the Gennan Civil Code,
sections 138 and 242, which have become parts of American law through adoption in the Unifonn
Commercial Code (U.C.C.). BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, RGBL
195, as amended, §§ 138, 242. Section 138's U.c.c. counterpart is section 2-302, which penn its
nonenforcement of "unconscionable" contracts or tenns. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). Section 242 requires
performance of contracts in "good faith,"' BGB § 242; its U.c.c. counterpart is section 1-304 (formerly
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General clauses do not permit judges to decide what they think is "fair"
or in the "general welfare.,,182 Instead, case groups develop in an almost
common-law manner. 183 Only where there are no prior decisions do judges
have some freedom in reaching new solutions. 184 Sometimes the
legislature notes the development of these case groups and enacts them
into law or introduces its own groups of cases.
When such indefinite concepts are used, there may be no "one meaning
to be made from general persuasive reasons." There thus becomes a range
of "justifiable decisions," although "some interpretations are more
justifiable than others." Zippelius prefers those interpretations that "can be
comprehensibly grounded upon (if not compelled by) rational arguments
rather than proven through general persuasive arguments.,,185

2. Discretion in Directing Legal Consequences
Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind decision-makers to one
correct decision, but grant them discretion to reach their own decisions
based on their own responsibility and independent choice. It is used to
permit a purposeful and just decision in the individual case. A common
view in Germany holds that discretion is appropriate only on the legalconsequences side of the legal norm. That is, discretion in choice of legal
consequences (e.g., five or ten years imprisonment) is appropriate, but not
in determination of the prerequisites for action (e.g., whether defendant
committed the crime of arson). This distinction marks a difference
between indefinite legal concepts and discretion: the former leaves room
for judgment in the prerequisites of action, while the latter provides for
freedom of action.
Administrative authorities are allowed to make policy-oriented
decisions upon their own responsibility; they may choose on the basis of
current and local interests among several possibilities. This freedom is
acceptable because administrative authorities are politically accountable.
Administrative authorities are nonetheless obligated to exercise their
freedom of choice in the public interest. Relaxation of binding to statute

section 1-203). U.C.c. § 1-304. For the origin of section 2-302, see Maxeiner, Standard-Terms
Contracting, supra note 117, at 116--17.
182. See Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Prazisierung des § 242 BGB, in 2
AUSGEWAHLTESCHRTFTEN 195,203 (1983).
183. See Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting, supra note 117, at 152-56.
184. Wieacker, supra note 182, at 203. Wieacker also notes that section 242 looks to issues of
individual justice and not to general welfare (policy). Id. at 196.
185. Id. at 135.
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for judicial decisions, on the other hand, is preferably limited to situations
where necessary to permit judges to do justice in individual cases. Judges
are not politically accountable; they are guaranteed independence to
permit them to do justice. 186 The German legal system uses rules in this
way to depoliticize certain decisions. It attempts to separate legal
questions from political ones. A legal question should be subject to
· WIt
. hout h
' to vaI ue. 187
reso I uttOn
avmg

3. Reasoned Explanations
In lawsuits, judges are required to give reasoned explanations for their
judgments. These judgments must deal with all possibly relevant laws and
party assertions. They have a prescribed form. Zippelius explains that
reasoned opinions help make up for shortcomings of statutes. As we just
saw, legislation cannot always predetermine solutions. Both legal and
factual premises may be uncertain. Sometimes legislation deliberately
grants law appliers a certain room for judgment as to whether a rule
applies (e.g., what constitutes "good faith") or discretion in ordering the
legal consequences of an applicable rule (e.g., whether to order
imprisonment or not). In all of these cases, choices of interpretation and
fact-finding possibilities do not always direct decision-makers to a single
correct solution. Yet, Zippelius stresses, that does not mean that all
justifiable decisions are alike. Some findings of fact, determinations of law
and applications of laws to facts are more justifiable than others.
Reasoned opinions enhance the quality of legal decisions. In the first
instance, they provide foundations for review of decisions made. Just the
knowledge that such a review is possible impels decision makers to selfcontrol. It requires them to base their decisions, or at least the
justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons (e.g., the statutory
requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., bias and prejudice). It
pushes them toward more careful handling of the materials of decision, the
fact and law finding, and law applying.
The judgment also controls the judge. If the judge fails to subsume the
facts of the case under the applicable law properly, the judge's decision is
subject to correction on appeal. The judgment demonstrates whether the
judge understood the losing party's position; through its impersonal and
colorless nature, it demonstrates the judge's neutrality.

186. In America, the federal court judges are also appointed by elected oflicials, as opposed to
elected by the public.
187. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS, supra note 63, at 15-16.
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The obligations to give reasons for decisions is a general requirement
of German law. The specifically judicial format is taught to all German
lawyers. 188
Were American trials a common occurrence, they would frequently
present decision makers with choices that propelled them toward a choice
between rules and best results. While bringing law and fact together is the
essence of applying law, American legal methods are based on separating
law from facts. This is done to allow judges to decide questions of law and
juries to decide questions of fact. Whether it is for judges or for juries to
apply law to facts has long been a hotly debated issue.
Historically, American pleading has sought to steer between the Scylla
and Charybdis but, instead, has crashed on the rocks of Scylla or been
swept into the whirlpool of Charybdis. On the one hand, in common law
pleading, the parties would agree to make a single issue-of fact or of
law-determinative. As any first year law student knows, rarely is there
only one issue in dispute. When the parties got it wrong, injustice would
result. On the other hand, in modern day notice pleading, often the parties
never get to an issue and the jury-if there is a jury trial-is sent out to
decide the case. In theory, jurors decide according to law, but no one
knows in practice since jurors do not explain why they decide as they do.
Jurors have freedom-greater or lesser depending upon whether the case is
criminal or civil-to decide as they wish, which may be contrary to law.
The jury might decide as it thinks best were it not for rules of evidence
that, as Schauer notes, "keep even relevant evidence away from a
frequently distrusted jury.,,189
In fact, trials have vanished in America. Settlements take into account
the likely decisions of decision makers, but consider even more important
the costs of getting there and the risks of worst-case outcomes. The costs
of getting there can be extraordinarily high, because the inefficiencies of
American procedure are many, and because control of those procedures
rests in the hands of the lawyers. American lawyers, unlike the judges who
control them in Germany, may have no interest in keeping those
procedures in bounds. The risks of worst-case outcomes is high because
American laws are uncertain and uncoordinated, decision-makers are
uncertain and uncoordinated, and most decisions are rendered without
reasoned explanations. How is one to predict how a case will come out
when one is unsure which laws apply, one is uncertain which officials will

188. MAXEINER. FAILURES. supra note 8, at 226-29.
189. SCHAUER, supra note 1. at 210.
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decide, one is unsure what they will be able to decree, but one does know
that those decisions will be, as jury verdicts and many other legal
decisions, unexplained?
Giving reasons does not have the same centrality in present-day
America as it does in Germany. Imprisoned by the assumption that juries
decide without giving reasons, Schauer opines that "[a]t times judges or
courts do not give reasons because doing so would be inefficient or
impossible as a practical matter.,,190 In another work, he goes further and
suggests that "[p]erhaps at times it is better not to give reasons than to give
them.,,191
Schauer argues as he does because of America's fixation on appellate
court decisions as law-making. In giving reasons, Schauer sees a court
announcing "what is in effect a rule (or a principle, standard, norm, or
maxim) more general than the decision itself. To provide a reason in a
particular case is to transcend the very particularity of that case."l92 In
Schauer's view, a court in giving a reason in a particular case is
committing to the reason as a rule in future cases. That is why, he says,
"we do not always require legal decision makers to give reasons for their
decisions.,,193 It is also why, however, courts reach the wrong result in the
real case because of their fear that reaching the right result in that case will
.
d'Ize resuI
Jeopar
ts'III ~I uture cases. 194
In German legal methods, giving reasons is principally an act of law
application. It is an explanation to the parties why the court decided this
particular case in the way it did. 195 It is not an exercise in lawmaking for
future, hypothetical cases.
CONCLUSION

American legal methods often lead to something other than the right
decision because American law does not clearly establish who is
responsible for which decision with what consequences. That failing leads
to Schauer's conclusion that "[r]ather than attempting to reach the best
result for each controversy in a wholly particularistic and contextual way,

190. Id. at 175.
191. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634 (1995) [hereinafter Schauer,
Giving Reasons].
192. SCHAUER, supra note 1 at 176-77.
193. Id. at 180.
194. Schauer, Giving Reasons, supra note 191, at 655-56.
195. See Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply Law, supra note 36, at 474-75.

92

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11 :55

law's goal is often to make sure that the outcome for all or at least most of
the particulars in a given category is the right one."l96
German legal methods provide rules that individuals can follow. They
assign responsibility for decisions. They allow legislatures to set goals and
principles and to require procedures and written justifications that frame
decision makers' choices. They do not allow the dead to rule the living.
They impose boundaries on lawsuits. They provide rules that allow
decision makers to reach better decisions in particular cases most of the
time.
German legal methods as described in Zippelius' book could inspire
American law reform. Indeed, they are already mirrored in much of the
Start Over initiative of the Common Good organization. The solution of
the Start Over initiative is to "Restore Responsibility." It states "[t]he key
tests for effective law are whether: 1) regulators have flexibility to make
sensible choices; 2) there are clear lines of accountability; and 3)
compliance by those expected to abide by the law is practical.,,197

196. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 8.
197. Radically Simplify Law, COMMON GOOD, http://www.commongood.orglpages/radicallysimplify-law (last visited May 2, 2012).

